

The Truth about Śrīgupta’s Two Truths: Longchen Rabjampa’s “Lower Svātantrikas” and the Making of a New Philosophical School

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Abstract

Longchen Rabjampa (1308–64), scholar of the Tibetan Buddhist Nyingma tradition, presents a novel doxographical taxonomy of the so-called Svātantrika branch of Madhyamaka Buddhist philosophy, which designates the Indian Mādhyamika Śrīgupta (c. 7th/8th century) as the exemplar of a Svātantrika sub-school according to which appearance and emptiness are metaphysically distinct. This paper compares Longchenpa’s characterization of this “distinct-appearance-and-emptiness” view with Śrīgupta’s own account of the two truths. I expose a significant disconnect between Longchenpa’s Śrīgupta and Śrīgupta himself and argue that the impetus for Longchenpa’s doxographical innovation originates not in Buddhist India, but within his own Tibetan intellectual milieu, tracing back to his twelfth-century Sangpu Monastery predecessors, Gyamarwa and Chapa.

Keywords

Longchen Rabjampa – Śrīgupta – Svātantrika Madhyamaka – two truths (*satyadvaya*) – doxography

1 Introduction¹

In Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism, debates over how to correctly characterize the relation between appearance (the way things seem to be) and reality

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented in the panel, “Mapping Intellectual Networks of Tibetan Scholasticism,” at the 15th Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan

(the way things actually are) often play out within the genre of doxography. Competing accounts of the appearance-reality distinction—framed in terms of the two truths (Skt. *satyadvaya*), i.e., the conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*) and the ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*)—are assigned to different philosophical systems and ordered in an ascending hierarchy. In his *Commentary on the Wish-fulfilling Treasury* (*Yid bzhin mdzod 'grel*, hereafter *Commentary*),² Longchen Rabjampa Drimé Özer (*klong chen rab 'byams pa dri med 'od zer*, hereafter Longchenpa) (1308–1364), renowned luminary of the Nyingma (*nying ma*) tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, sets out a doxographical ordering of his own Madhyamaka school in which the dispute over the relation between the two truths is reframed as internal to doxographical subdivisions within the Svātantrika Madhyamaka tradition. Speaking for his own sub-school, Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, Longchenpa alleges that this entire debate is misguided inasmuch as it is based on a fundamental misunderstanding that hypostatizes the two truths as things that could stand in some real relation with one another, when the actual state of affairs lies beyond such conceptual fabrications (Tib. *spros bral*). Longchenpa, in effect, clarifies his view of the two truths by contrast with a series of subdivisions of the Svātantrika, and in so doing, he presents what appears to be a novel taxonomy of Svātantrika Madhyamaka.³

This paper presents Longchenpa's characterization of one of these Svātantrika sub-schools, which he describes as maintaining that appearance and emptiness are numerically distinct entities because they instantiate contradictory properties. On this view, appearance and emptiness (i.e., the universal negation of ontologically independent being, Skt. *svabhāvaśūnyatā*) are identified respectively with the conventional and ultimate truths/

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2 Longchenpa's root text, the *Precious Wish-fulfilling Treasury* (*Yid bzhin rin po che'i mdzod*), devotes a single stanza to the Svātantrika, dividing the Svātantrika into higher and lower sub-schools, though not further subdividing the lower Svātantrikas; 43a5–b1: *rang rgyud sde pas bden gnyis dbye ba yis // chos rnams yod med spros par rab 'gog cing // snang ba'i mam bzhag zhib mor byed de yang // gong 'og rang bzhin rnal don gzhan du 'gyur //*

3 For discussions on the disputed historical development of the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika categories, which are likely Tibetan innovations, see Georges Dreyfus and Sara McClintock, eds., *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction* (Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2003) and David Seyfort Ruegg, "The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction in the history of Madhyamaka thought," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 49:3/4 (2006), 319–346. The terms "Svātantrika" and "Prāsaṅgika" are not known to have been used as doxographic labels in Buddhist India, and since they are unattested Sanskrit terms, they ought to be marked with an asterisk, but due to their common usage in contemporary scholarship, I omit this.

realities.⁴ Longchenpa's account of this view will be compared with the presentation of the two truths according to the Indian Buddhist philosopher, Śrīgupta (7th/8th cent.?), who is the only exemplar of this sub-school named by Longchenpa. With this analysis, I aim to discern Longchenpa's grounds for identifying Śrīgupta as the representative of this sub-school, and to thereby shed light on the underlying philosophical and intellectual-historical motivations behind Longchenpa's doxographical innovation. I will argue that there is, in fact, a substantive disagreement between Longchenpa's Śrīgupta and Śrīgupta himself on the topic of the two truths and that Longchenpa's invention and criticism of this sub-school is grounded not in Buddhist India, but in his own Tibetan intellectual milieu.

2 An Inquiry into the Grounds for Longchenpa's Doxographical Assignment of Śrīgupta

In his *Commentary*, Longchenpa divides the Svātantrika into lower and higher sub-schools (Tib. *rang rgyud 'og ma* and *rang rgyud gong ma*), with the lower Svātantrikas further sub-divided into: (1) those, such as *Sāgaramegha,⁵ who maintain that the ultimate truth is the illusory nature of things (*sgyu ma don dam pa*),⁶ corresponding roughly to the Māyopamādvayavādins,⁷ an attested

4 The semantic range of *satya* is inclusive of "truth," "reality," and "existence." While "two truths" is the most popular translation of *satyadvaya* in contemporary scholarship, "two realities" is more fitting for much of the present discussion given that Longchenpa is analyzing the relation between appearances and their mode of existence (which we might gloss as the apparent reality and the actual reality), rather than the relationship between two claims about the way things exist. Depending on the context, I will, thus, use "two truths" and "two realities" interchangeably.

5 *Sāgaramegha's (c. eighth century?) only known work is a lengthy commentary on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the *Yogācārabhūmaubodhisattvabhūmivākyā* (D 4047).

6 Longchenpa ascribes to this sub-school the position that the two truths refer to two aspects of the one appearing, yet empty illusion; see *Commentary*, vol. 2, 99a–101a.

7 Orna Almogi notes that Longchenpa seems to identify the Lower Svātantrikas with Māyopamādvayavādins. However, in Longchenpa's discussion in his *Commentary*, Māyopamādvayavāda only correspond to one subdivision of the Lower Svātantrikas, exemplified by Sāgaramegha; see Almogi, *Rong-zom-pa's Discourses on Buddhism: A Study of Various Conceptions of Buddhahood in Indian Sources with Special Reference to the Controversy Surrounding the Existence of Gnosis (jñāna: ye shes) as Presented by the Eleventh-century Tibetan Scholar Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po* (Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies, 2009), 476 n. 2.

classification in late Indic doxographies;⁸ and (2) those who maintain that the two truths qua appearance and emptiness are distinct (*snang stong tha dad pa*), which seems to be a novel category.⁹ Curiously, the figure that Longchenpa designates as the representative of this second “misguided” philosophical position is Śrīgupta, who is identified by Tibetan sources as the teacher of Jñānagarbha (early eighth century),¹⁰ and whose account of the two truths closely aligns with Jñānagarbha’s own. Nevertheless, Jñānagarbha together with his successors, Śāntarakṣita (eighth century) and Kamalaśīla (late eighth century), fare better doxographically, being identified by Longchenpa as “higher Svātantrikas” who correctly recognize that the two truths lie beyond the extremes of being either distinct or non-distinct.¹¹

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- 8 In late Indic works, we find Madhyamaka divided into the two sub-schools of Māyopamādvayavāda (“illusory nonduality” view) and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda (“all things have no foundation” view). For a discussion of these sources and the significance of these labels therein, see Almogī, “Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda: A Late Indian Subclassification of Madhyamaka and its Reception in Tibet,” *Journal of the International College of Postgraduate Buddhist Studies* 14 (2010), 135–212.
- 9 It is worth noting that this division of Lower Svātantrika into two sub-schools had a lasting impact, finding renewed popularity upon being endorsed by the renowned Rimé (*ris med*) scholar, Jamgön Ju Mipham Gyatso (*jam mgon ju mi pham rgya mtsho*, 1846–1912) in his *Summary of Philosophical Systems in the Wish-fulfilling Treasury* (*Yid bzhin mdzod kyi grub mtha’ bsdud pa*).
- 10 The standard Tibetan account of the sequence of the Mūlasarvāstivāda preceptor lineage for monastic ordination that entered Tibet is as follows: Bhāviveka → Śrīgupta → Jñānagarbha → Śāntarakṣita → Kamalaśīla. See, for instance, Butön Rinchen drup’s (*bu ston rin chen grub*, 1290–1364) *History of Buddhism* (*Chos ’byung gsung rab rin po che’i gter mdzod*) (Dehradun: Drikung Partrun Khang, 1989), 141b. See also Gö Lotsawa Zhönnupel’s (*gos lo tsā ba gzhon nu dpal*, 1392–1481) *Blue Annals* (*Deb gter sngon po*), Śata-Piṭaka Series vol. 212, edited by Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi: The International Academy of Indian Culture, 1971), 17a. I thus follow Seyfort Ruegg, in placing Śrīgupta roughly in the seventh century; see Seyfort Ruegg *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 1981), 67. This relative chronology has been challenged by several contemporary scholars, including Mamoru Kobayashi, “*Tattvātāra* of Śrīgupta: Japanese Annotated Translation I,” *Ronshū* 19 (1992), 37–42, who argues that Śrīgupta post-dates Śāntarakṣita. A treatment of this issue lies beyond the scope of the present paper, though I argue elsewhere that there is insufficient evidence to upend the Tibetan relative chronology; see Allison Aitken, *Introduction to Reality: Śrīgupta’s Tattvātāravṛtti*, Harvard Oriental Series, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).
- 11 *Commentary*, vol. 2, 103b6–104b2.

Śrīgupta's only extant Madhyamaka work,¹² the *Tattvāvatāra* (TA) and its accompanying auto-commentary, the *Tattvāvatāravṛtti* (TAV), survive only in Tibetan translation, and the root text is no longer extant as an independent treatise, preserved only as embedded in the auto-commentary.¹³ The TAV is devoted almost entirely to the neither-one-nor-many argument (Skt. *ekānekaviyogahetu*), used to establish the Madhyamaka ultimate truth of emptiness. This text is a likely precursor to Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (MA) and looks to be the earliest extant fully developed formulation of the Madhyamaka neither-one-nor-many argument, which was to become renowned as one of the four or sometimes five great Madhyamaka lines of reasoning for establishing emptiness (Tib. *gtan tshigs chen po bzhi/lnga*).

2.1 *Reasons to Question Longchenpa's Doxographical Assignment of Śrīgupta*

There are a number of reasons why Longchenpa's designation of Śrīgupta as the sole exemplar of the lower Svātantrikas who maintain appearance and emptiness as distinct is *prima facie* puzzling:

(i) At no point in the TAV does Śrīgupta explicitly claim that appearance and emptiness are distinct. In fact, the only time that Śrīgupta even invokes the concepts of distinct and non-distinct (Skt. *bheda*, *abheda*) is in arguing that the mind (*jñāna/citta*) and mental content (*ākāra*) are neither distinct nor non-distinct, and thus the mind cannot be a true unity.¹⁴

12 The only other extant text attributed to (a) Śrīgupta is the *Śrīratnamañjarīṭikā* (D 1217) in the tantra (*rgyud*) section of the Tengyur.

13 For this reason, both texts will be signified by TAV, except when differentiating *kārikā*-s belonging to the root text from transitional stanzas (*antaraśloka*) and summary stanzas (*saṃgrahaśloka*) belonging to the commentary. The TA has 27 *kārikā*-s, while the TAV includes prose commentary as well as 22 transitional stanzas (*antaraśloka*) and six summary stanzas (*saṃgrahaśloka*). The *Pangtangma Catalogue* (*dKar chag 'Phang thang ma*) also lists the TA and TAV separately; see Eishin Kawagoe, *dKar chag 'Phang thang ma* (Sendai: Tohoku Society for Indo-Tibetan Studies, 2005), 27. The *Denkarma Catalogue* (*dKar chag lDan dkar ma*), however, lists only the TAV with no separate entry for the TA; see Marcelle Lalou, "Les Textes Bouddhiques au temps du Roi Khri-sroñ-lde-bcan," *Journal Asiatique* 241 (1953), 333. See Yasunori Ejima's Japanese translation of TA, *Chūgan shisō no tenkai—Bhāvavīkeka Kenkyū* (Tokyo: Shunjōsha, 1980), 217–221, and Kobayashi's Japanese translation of the TAV, "Tattvāvatāra of Śrīgupta: Japanese Annotated Translation I," and "Tattvāvatāra of Śrīgupta: Japanese Annotated Translation II," *Mikkyō Bunka* 85 (1994), 99–80.

14 This line of reasoning constitutes a sub-argument in Śrīgupta's neither-one-nor-many argument in support of *paśṣadharmatā*, i.e., the proof of the presence of the reason property in the subject of the inference.

(ii) Given that the TAV text structure and content have extensive parallels to Śāntarakṣita's MA/MAV (and this being Śrīgupta's only Madhyamaka text), one may naturally wonder why Longchenpa categorizes Śrīgupta differently from Śāntarakṣita on the basis of their respective characterizations of the relation between the two truths.¹⁵ Indeed, the opening stanzas of these two texts, which present the central inference from the reason of neither-one-nor-many, are nearly identical, differing only in the subject of the inference (though both subjects are all-inclusive, simply dividing the universal domain along different lines):

Śrīgupta's TA 1:

*phyi rol nang na gnas 'di kun //
yang dag tu ni rang bzhin med //
gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin
nyid //
bral ba'i phyir na gzugs brnyan
bzhin //*¹⁶

(p) All that there is externally and internally
(s) in reality lacks independent being,
(h) due to lacking independent being that is either one or many,
(d) like a reflection.

Śāntarakṣita's MA 1:

*bdag dang gzhan smra'i dngos 'di dag //
yang dag tu na gcig pa dang //
du ma'i rang bzhin bral ba'i phyir //
rang bzhin med de gzugs brnyan bzhin //*¹⁷
*niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tattvataḥ
svaparoditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvena
vīyogāt pratibimbavat //*¹⁸

(p) All that is propounded by our own and other [philosophical systems]
(s) in reality lacks independent being,
(h) due to lacking independent being that is either one or many,
(d) like a reflection.

(iii) Not only does Śāntarakṣita closely follow Śrīgupta's strategy for establishing the ultimate truth, but he also adopts Śrīgupta's three-fold defining criterion for conventional reality:

15 See Aitken, *Introduction to Reality*, for a detailed topical outline of the TA/TAV with parallel passages from the MA/MAV.

16 TA 1, 101 (All citations of the TA/TAV refer to the Tengyur Pedurma edition, B 3121, vol. 63, 101–12).

17 Masamichi Ichigō, "Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālamkāra*," in *Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle: Three Mahāyāna Buddhist Texts*, ed. by Luis O. Gómez and Jonathan A. Silk. (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1989), 190.

18 Sanskrit as preserved in Prajñākaramati's (c. tenth–eleventh century) BCAP, Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Ćāntideva*, (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1901–1914), 358.

Śrīgupta's TA 11:

*ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' ste //
de 'dra las byung de bzhin no //
dngos po de dag de lta bu'i //
don bya de dang de byed do //*¹⁹

[1] Satisfying only when not analyzed,
[2] [things] arise from [causes] similar
to themselves. [3] Those things enact
their respective forms of causal
efficacy.

Śāntarakṣita's MA 64:

*ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zhing //
skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa //
don byed pa dag nus rnams kyi //
rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs //*²⁰

The conventional should be
understood as something whose
nature: [1] satisfies only when not
analyzed, [2] has the properties
of arising and disintegrating, and
[3] has the capacity for causal
efficacy.

Here, Śrīgupta claims that conventionally real appearances (1) satisfy when not analyzed (**avicāraikaramaṇīya*),²¹ (2) arise from causes (*hetujāta*), i.e., are interdependently originated (*pratītyasamutpanna*), and (3) have the capacity for causal efficacy (**arthakriyāśakti/arthakriyāsamārtha*). This same set of three criteria is also affirmed by Longchenpa's so-called higher Svātantrikas, Jñānagarbha and Kamalaśīla, as well as Haribhadra, the later Bhāviveka (author of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and *Mahāyānaśaṃgraha*), and Atīśa.²²

(iv) Butön makes the only identified doxographical assignment of Śrīgupta that predates Longchenpa, and given points (ii) and (iii), it is unsurprising that he categorizes Śrīgupta together with Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla as a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika.²³ Butön was, in fact, a teacher of one of Longchenpa's own teachers, Lama Dampa Sönam Gyeltsen (*bla ma dam pa*

19 TA 11, 105. The TAV comments, 105–6: *de lta bas na phyi rol dang nang na snang ba'i dngos po brtag pa'i spungs mi bzod pa rang dang mthun pa'i rgyus bskyed pa 'di dag ni gang las tha snyad 'dir 'gyur ba don bya ba ma brtags na nyams dga' ba nyid de dang der nye bar byed do //*. "Thus, regarding these things that appear both externally and internally, which cannot withstand the pressure of analysis and which are produced from causes similar to themselves, if one has not examined the causal efficacy based on which these conventional [appearances] come into being, one will approach satisfaction here and there."

20 Ichigō, "Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*," 202.

21 One also finds related terms such as *avicāramanaṇīya*, *avicāramanohara*, and *avicāritaramaṇīya*.

22 See Jñānagarbha's SDV 8, 12, and 21, Kamalaśīla's MAP ad 64, Haribhadra's AAA (Wogihara, 594.18–25), the later Bhāviveka's MAS 9–11 and MRP I.4, and Atīśa's SDA 3.

23 Butön, *History*, 114b; Obermiller, *The History*, 135.

bsod nams rgyal mtshan, 1312–1375),²⁴ so it is not entirely far-fetched to surmise that Longchenpa may have been aware of Butön’s classification of Śrīgupta.

(v) Finally, despite the fact that Longchenpa engages in a rather involved discussion and refutation of the distinct-appearance-and-emptiness view that he ascribes to Śrīgupta, he provides no citations from Śrīgupta to substantiate this attribution. He cites sūtras on behalf of Śrīgupta, but nowhere in his entire collected works does he cite Śrīgupta himself.

Why, then, does Longchenpa select Śrīgupta as the representative of this sub-school? In an effort to solve this puzzle, I will identify some of the principal commitments that Longchenpa ascribes to “Śrīgupta’s sub-school,” and seek out textual grounding in Śrīgupta’s TAV to verify them. For ease of discussion, I will refer to Longchenpa’s Lower Svātantrikas who maintain appearance and emptiness to be distinct as “Śrīgupta’s sub-school,” though of course, Śrīgupta would not have identified with this or any Svātantrika sub-school, since the Svātantrika category was a later, most probably Tibetan innovation.

2.2 Longchenpa’s Śrīgupta vs. Śrīgupta’s TAV on the Two Truths

Longchenpa begins his presentation of “Śrīgupta’s sub-school,” the proponents of the distinct-appearance-and-emptiness view, by attributing two claims to it:²⁵

Claim 1: *Ultimately, appearances are empty because they are not established.*

Claim 2: *Conventionally, appearances are not empty because they are causally efficacious.*

Śrīgupta would indeed affirm Claim 1, that *ultimately, appearances are empty because they are not established*. In other words, upon ultimate analysis, appearances are not found to enjoy ontologically independent being. This is the claim

24 On the life and work of Lama Dampa Sönam Gyaltzen, the 14th Sakya throne holder (*sa skya khri ’dzin*), holding the office from 1344–47, see Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp, “Fourteenth Century Tibetan Cultural History III: The Oeuvre of Bla ma Dam pa Bsod nams rgyal mtshan (1312–1375), Part One,” *Berliner Indologische Studien* 7 (1993): 109–47, and “Fourteenth Century Tibetan Cultural History III: The Oeuvre of Bla ma Dam pa Bsod nams rgyal mtshan (1312–1375), Part Two,” *Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines* 46 (2018): 5–89.

25 *Commentary*, vol. 2, 102a2–b1: *yang slob dpon dpal sbas la sogs pa kha cig ni sgyu ma don dam pa ma yin te / ji ltar snang ba kun rdzob tu rkyen las skyes pa’i phyir snang bar bden la / don dam par ci yang ma grub ste / ’phags pa bden pa gnyis bstan pa’i mdo las / kun rdzob tu ni dngos po’i ngo bo nyid do // don dam par ni ci yang mi dmigs so zhes pa dang / yum las / don dam par ni ’ga’ yang yongs su grub pa med do zhes gsungs pas / kun rdzob tu stong pa nyid ma yin te don byed par nus pas dbang po’i snang yul so so la bden pa’i phyir ro // don dam par stong pa nyid yin te ci yang ma grub pa’i phyir zhes ’dod do //*

that Śrīgupta's neither-one-nor-many argument sets out to establish, and it also agrees with Śrīgupta's criterion for conventionally real appearances as satisfying our pre-theoretical notions of existence only when their ultimate nature is not subjected to analysis. Yet, as shown above, on this point, Śrīgupta is in good company with Longchenpa's so-called Higher Svātantrikas, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla, as well as Atiśa, etc. But what about Claim 2, that, *conventionally, appearances are not empty because they are causally efficacious*? One potentially promising piece of textual support reads as follows:

From the standpoint of the ultimate,
things are devoid of unity, non-unity, etc.
If one has not engaged in examination,
then [things] appear to have a satisfactory nature.

TAV AŚ 8²⁶

Perhaps Longchenpa reads Śrīgupta's claim that things "appear to have a satisfactory nature" when not examined as implying that, conventionally, appearances are not empty. This reading would, however, be stretching the text, for the claim that things *appear* to have a satisfactory nature when not examined is not at all the same as the claim that conventionally things *do in fact* have independent being and are therefore not empty. Moreover, Claim 2 has it that things are not empty conventionally because they are causally efficacious, and Śrīgupta does not invoke causal efficacy here. The criterion of causal efficacy was used by subsequent, "Higher Svātantrikas" to differentiate between true and false conventions, or real and unreal conventional things (*tathyaśaṃvṛti* and *mithyāśaṃvṛti*); Śrīgupta, however, does not claim that *the conventional is divided into real and unreal* (Claim 3), though Longchenpa alleges that he does.²⁷

Longchenpa attributes to Śrīgupta the further claim that *a defining characteristic of the ultimate is that it can withstand analysis* (Claim 4). This, Longchenpa contrasts with a reformulation of Claim 1: *a defining characteristic of the*

26 TAV AŚ 8, 106: *dam pa'i don du gcig pa dang // du ma la sogs dngos dang bral // nam par rtog pa ma byas na // nyams dga' ba yi ngo bor snang //*.

27 Longchenpa, *Commentary*, vol. 2, 102b: *yang dag kun rdzob zla gcig lta bu mtshan nyid la mi bslu ba dang / log pa'i kun rdzob zla gnyis su snang ba ltar mtshan nyid las bslu bar dbye zhing / don dam cir yang ma grub pas dbye bsal med do /*. Śrīgupta instead claims simply that conventional things appear to have causal efficacy, but that efficacy does not withstand analysis. See TAV *ad k.* 11 in note 18 above.

conventional is that it cannot withstand analysis (Claim 1*).²⁸ As Longchenpa argues, Śrīgupta must accept that these two realities are numerically distinct entities on pain of violating a version of the Law of Non-contradiction, according to which contradictory properties are not predicable of a single subject. In other words, Longchenpa charges that because Śrīgupta (purportedly) accepts that the two realities instantiate contradictory properties, he is committed to the negation of their numerical identity, and must therefore accept the distinct-appearance-and-emptiness view. We might formalize this line of reasoning as follows:

- P1 A defining characteristic of the ultimate is that it can withstand analysis. (= Claim 4)
 P2 A defining characteristic of the conventional is that it cannot withstand analysis. (= Claim 1*)
 ∴ C1 The two realities instantiate contradictory properties. (from P1 and P2)
 P3 Contradictory properties are not predicable of a single entity. (Law of Non-contradiction)
 ∴ C2 The two realities are distinct entities. (from C1 and P3)

As noted, Śrīgupta endorses Premise 2 (= Claim 1*) in TA 11 as part of his three-fold definition of the conventional. Śrīgupta would also endorse Premise 3, for he commonly relies on the Law of Non-contradiction in his own arguments. But there is no evidence that he would endorse Premise 1 (= Claim 4); nowhere does he claim that the ultimate *is* able to withstand analysis. He is silent on the properties of emptiness, if indeed it can be said to have any at all. In fact, Śrīgupta mentions the term “ultimate” (*don dam* and *dam pa'i don*), only three times, and in each instance, it is (at least in the Tibetan translation) adverbialized (*don dam par*, *dam pa'i don du*) to function as a qualifier,²⁹ and he mentions “emptiness” only once, though with no predications made of it.³⁰ While

28 *Commentary*, vol. 2, 102b1–4: *rigs pa yang don dam gyi mtshan nyid dpyad bzod yin la / kun rdzob kyi mtshan nyid dpyad mi bzod yin pas na de dag dngos 'gal yin no bden rdzun gnyis gcig tu mi rung ba'i phyir chos can dang chos nyid ma yin no // yin na kun rdzob mi rtag pa ltar kun rdzob kyi chos nyid don dam bden pa yang mi rtag par thal ba'am / chos nyid don dam skye 'gag med pa ltar kun rdzob bden pa'ang skye 'gag mi byed pa'i skyon yod de / des na sna tshogs su snang brtags thams cad kun rdzob yin la /*

29 TAV homage stanza, 101: *gang gis dam pa'i don du na [P, N, G: ni] // 'gro kun rang bzhin med gsungs pa // ...*; TAV ad k. 1, 101: *gang zhig gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang bral ba de ni don dam par rang bzhin [G: adds mad] med de / ...*; TAV AŚ 8ab: *dam pa'i don du gcig pa dang // du ma la sogs dngos dang bral // ...*

30 TAV AŚ 17a, 108: *de bas don kun stong pa nyid //*.

Longchenpa may take issue with Śrīgupta's use of the qualifier, once again, this practice places him in company with Longchenpa's so-called higher Svāntarikas, and is thus no help in resolving our puzzle. Since Śrīgupta does not endorse Premise 1 (= Claim 4)—that a *defining characteristic of the ultimate is its capacity to withstand analysis*—he is not committed to either Conclusion 1, that the two realities instantiate contradictory properties, or Conclusion 2, that the two realities are distinct entities. In sum, Śrīgupta neither explicitly claims that *appearances and emptiness are distinct* (Claim 5), nor is he implicitly committed to it on the basis of Longchenpa's argument.

As we have seen, there is a rather sizeable disconnect between “Śrīgupta's sub-school” and Śrīgupta himself. Of the thus far identified five claims that Longchenpa attributes to Śrīgupta, textual support can only be adduced for the first, that *ultimately, appearances are empty due to being unestablished*. Yet on this point, Śrīgupta stands in agreement with a great many other “higher” Mādhyamikas. We might thus pause at this point to inquire into Longchenpa's motivation. That is, did Longchenpa need to accommodate Śrīgupta or did the doxography need to accommodate this view? Given the foregoing textual analysis, together with the fact that Śrīgupta was, by no measure, a towering authority in Tibet, we may safely rule out the possibility that this sub-school was innovated in order to accommodate Śrīgupta. Rather, this seems to be a case of a view that needed a figurehead. But, the question remains, why Śrīgupta? Surely, Longchenpa did not simply draw his name out of a hat! Doxography is, to some extent, a practice in exaggerating difference and similarity, generally to some pedagogical or rhetorical end. Still, it is reasonable to expect doxographical assignments to be tethered to *some* textual foundation, particularly when we have only a *single* figure representing an entire school of thought.

In an attempt to sleuth out some clues, let us first take a closer look at Śrīgupta's TAV vis-à-vis Śāntarakṣita's MA/MAV. There are two philosophically significant points of disagreement between these works that may bear on their respective doxographical classifications:

(i) Despite the fact that Śāntarakṣita adopts Śrīgupta's threefold criterion for conventional reality, there is a notable difference in their presentations of this topic. In MA 91, Śāntarakṣita identifies cause and effect as merely mental in nature and endorses a form of Yogācāra idealism on the conventional level.³¹ Śrīgupta does not endorse Yogācāra idealism, provisionally or otherwise. This

31 MA 91: *rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa yang // shes pa 'ba' zhiq kho na ste // rang gis grub pa gang yin pa // de ni shes par gnas pa yin //* (Ichigō, “Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālamkāra*,” 220).

difference may help explain why Longchenpa places these two figures in different doxographical boxes (as Shakya Chokden and others will after him),³² but it is not immediately apparent how Śrīgupta's unqualified rejection of Yogācāra idealism might commit him to the distinct-appearance-and-emptiness view, which requires that he accept that emptiness, unlike appearances, withstands analysis.

(ii) A claim in the TAV that perhaps finds the most tenuous connection with Śāntarakṣita's MA/MAV is Śrīgupta's unusual assertion that a buddha has conceptual gnosis (Skt. **vikalpajñāna*, Tib. *rnam par rtog pa'i ye shes/rnam rtog ye shes*). Śrīgupta claims,

Given that the possession of conceptual gnosis
is a method for benefitting sentient beings,
since it is for their sake that omniscience commences,
there is no fault [in a buddha's possessing conceptual gnosis].³³

TA 15

In fact, prior to Longchenpa, many scholars, including Rongzom Chökyi Zangpo (*rong zom chos kyi bzang po*, c. 11th century), who is well known to have influenced Longchenpa, Sönam Tsemo (*bsod nams rtse mo*, 1142–82),³⁴ Jetsün Drakpa Gyeltsen (*rje btsun grags pa rgyal mtshan*, 1147–1216),³⁵ and Chomden Rikpé Reldri (*bcom ldan rig[s] pa'i ral gri*, 1227–1305),³⁶ utilized the status of enlightened gnosis as a differentiating criterion in their doxographical

32 Serdok Penchen Shakya Chokden (*gser mdog pañ chen śākya mchog ldan*, 1428–1507) identifies Śrīgupta as a Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika together with Jñānagarbha, while categorizing Śāntarakṣita as a Yogācāra-Mādhyamika; see Iaroslav Komarovski, *Three Texts on Madhyamaka by Shakya Chokden* (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 2000), 12.

33 TA 15, 108: *sems can gyi ni don mdzad thabs // rnam rtog ye shes mnga' ba na // de yi kun mkhyen rtsom [P, N, G: brtsom] pa ni // de don yin phyir nyes pa med //*. See also TAV AŚ 14, TA 16, TAV AŚ 15–20. See Almqvist (*Rong-zom-pa's Discourses*, 168–69, 184, 341) for an alternate translation and discussion of TA 15–16 and TAV AŚ 15–20.

34 See Sönam Tsemo's commentary on Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (*sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa*, 296a4–5). In this, he seems to develop the observation by Gyamarwa Jangchupdrak (*rgya dmar ba byang chub grags*, fl. c. 1095–1135) in his own commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (63a.3–64a.1) of two competing Madhyamaka views on whether or not gnosis ceases upon enlightenment; see Kevin Vose's discussion in "Making and Remaking the Ultimate in Early Tibetan Readings of Śāntideva," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 32, no. 1–2 (2010), 305.

35 *Precious Tree* (*Rin po che'i ljon shing*), 43a.1–4; see Vose's discussion of this passage in "Madhyamaka Schools in Early Tibet," *Critical Review for Buddhist Studies* 20 (2016), 74.

36 *Flower to Ornament the Philosophical Systems*, 391ff. See discussion below in §3.

categorizations.³⁷ Perhaps, then, there is a connection between Longchenpa's designation of Śrīgupta as the representative of the distinct-appearance-and-emptiness view and Śrīgupta's atypical assertion that buddhas possess conceptual gnosis.³⁸ After all, if a buddha—a reliable epistemic agent (Skt. *pramāṇabhūta*) whose cognition is invariably veridical—cognizes two different objects, appearance and emptiness, by means of two different gnoses, one conceptual and the other non-conceptual, then one might reasonably infer that these two ways of knowing track a real distinction in the world.

But is there any reason to believe that Longchenpa was even aware of Śrīgupta's stance on enlightened gnosis or his unqualified rejection of the Yogācāra view on the status of external objects? After all, there is no known record of Longchenpa's having received teachings on the TAV, so it is not a foregone conclusion that Longchenpa had even read Śrīgupta's text, particularly in light of the above analysis. To investigate the textual circumstances under which Longchenpa might have been exposed to Śrīgupta's thought, it may be helpful to survey the known citations of Śrīgupta's work in late Indic and early Tibetan scholastic literature leading up to Longchenpa. And since Śrīgupta is a lesser cited figure in Tibetan intellectual history, tracing citations of his TAV may have the added benefit of helping to illuminate patterns of influence within intellectual networks in early Tibetan scholasticism.

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- 37 Tibetan doxographies commonly differentiate figures based on whether or not they maintain that a buddha possesses gnosis at all, and if so, whether this includes strictly (1) the non-conceptual, transcendent gnosis (*nirvikalpajñāna*, *lokottarajñāna*)—which is associated with the aspect of omniscience that knows the ultimate truth of how things exist (*yathāvadbhāvikatā*) and with the gnosis of meditative equipoise (*samāhitajñāna*)—or whether it also includes (2) pure mundane gnosis (*śuddhalaukikajñāna*)—which is associated with the aspect of omniscience that knows the conventional, or the extent of whatever exists (*yāvadbhāvikatā*), and with post-attainment gnosis (*prṣṭhalabdhajñāna*).
- 38 While it is not uncommon to uphold pure mundane gnosis (*śuddhalaukikajñāna*) at the level of a buddha, and while pure mundane gnosis is commonly regarded as conceptual on lower bodhisattva stages (*bhūmi*), it is unusual to claim that a buddha's pure mundane gnosis is conceptual. Ernst Steinkellner points out that the tantric *Tattvasiddhi*, which is attributed to Śāntarakṣita, seems to accept that a buddha's omniscient gnosis is conceptual (*rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i ye shes*), though the genuine authorship of this work and the position expounded therein require further examination; see Steinkellner, "Is the Ultimate Cognition of the Yogin Conceptual or Non-conceptual? Part I: A Critical Edition of the Tantric *Tattvasiddhi*, Final Section," in *Le Parole e i marmi: Studi in onore di Raniero Gnoli nel suo 70° compleanno*, ed. by Raffaele Torella et al. (Rome: ISIAO, 2001), 835.

3 The Reception of Śrīgupta's Thought in Early Tibetan Scholasticism

The table below presents the thus far identified citations of Śrīgupta's TA/TAV in Indian and Tibetan literature prior to Longchenpa:

TABLE 1 Citations of Śrīgupta's TA/TAV Prior to Longchenpa

Author	Text	Citation from <i>Tattvāvatāravṛtti</i>
Dharmamitra (fl. c. 800)	<i>Abhisamayālaṅkāraprasphuṭapadā</i> ^a	TA 14, TA 15, TAV AŚ 11cd ^b
Anonymous	* <i>Vipaśyanotpādanopāya</i> (<i>Lhag mthong skyed pa'i thabs</i>)	TA 1, TAV AŚ 3abc/TA 6d, TAV AŚ 4 ^c
Kṛṣṇa (?) (c. 11th century)	* <i>Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravivṛttipañjikā</i> ^d	TA 8 ^e
Bodhibhadra (fl. c. 1000)	<i>Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana</i>	TAV AŚ 11 ^f
Atiśa (attributed) (982–1054 CE)	<i>Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā</i>	TA 1, TA 13 ^g
*Prajñāmukti/Prajñāmokṣa (c. 11th century)	<i>Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti</i>	TA 3ab and TA 7ab ^h

- a Dharmamitra's *Abhisamayālaṅkāraprasphuṭapadā* (D 3796), which is the earliest sub-commentary on Haribhadra's *Sphuṭārthā*, was translated into Tibetan in the second half of the eleventh century by Abhiyuktaka Tāraśrīmitra and Gorup Lotsawa Chökyi Sherap (*go rub lo tsā ba chos kyi shes rab*), a teacher of Rongzompa's.
- b TA 14–15 are cited at B 3019, vol. 52, 936, and TAV AŚ 11cd at 896.
- c TA 1 is cited at B 3611, vol. 116, 1344–5, TAV AŚ 3abc is cited at 1462, and TAV AŚ 4 is cited at 1471. The **Vipaśyanotpādanopāya*'s translation of TAV AŚ 3c includes variants from the TAV translation, which result in a line that is identical to TA 6d.
- d The author of the **Bodhisattvacaryāvatāravivṛttipañjikā* (D 3873, *Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i nam par bshad pa'i dka' 'grel*) is unknown, though the colophons of the G and N editions attribute it to Ācārya Kṛṣṇa (*slob dpon nag po*), who authored the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāraduravabodha-nirṇāyan āmagranthā*. This work appears to be the earliest extant commentary on the BCA and survives only in Tibetan translation. For an edition of chapter nine of this text, see Akira Saito, *A Study of Akṣayamatī* (= *Śāntideva*)'s "*Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*" as Found in the Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang (Mie, Japan: Mie University, 1993). TA 8 is cited in commenting on the first chapter of the BCA.
- e B 301, vol. 61, 1690; though explicitly attributed to the TA, this citation is rendered in prose rather than verse.
- f B 3079, vol. 57, 899.
- g TA 1 is cited at B 3178, vol. 64, 1743, and TA 13 at 1756.
- h TA 3ab is cited at B 3161, vol. 64, 354–55, and TA 7ab at 356.

TABLE 1 Citations of Śrīgupta's TA/TAV Prior to Longchenpa (*cont.*)

Author	Text	Citation from <i>Tattvāvatāravṛtti</i>
Jñānavajra (late 11th century)	<i>Āryalaṅkāvatāranāmamahāyāna- sūtravṛttitathāgataḥṛdayālaṅkāra</i>	TA 2a ⁱ
Gyamarwa Jangchupdrak (12th century)	<i>Analysis of the Essence of Madhyamaka (dBu ma de kho na nyid rnam par spyod pa) Commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra (Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i tshig don gsal bar bshad pa)</i>	TA 15b ^j Alludes to TA 15 ^k
Tsang Nakpa Tsöndrū Senggé (?–after 1195) ^l	<i>Eloquent Summary Commenting on the Pramāṇavinīścaya (Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i ṭika legs bshad bsdsu pa)</i>	TA 13 ^m
Jikten Gönpö Rinchen Pel (1143–1217)		TAV sŚ 3, though attributed to Śāntideva ⁿ

i B 3241, vol. 70, 98.

j *Analysis*, in *Collected Works of the Kadampas* (Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2006), vol. 31, 29a.3: *slob dpon dpal sbas kyis [rnam rtog ye shes mnga' bas na zhes] rnam rtog kyang bshad la |*; see also Pascale Hugon and Kevin Vose's edition and translation in progress at: http://www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/RGyadMarBaByangChubGrags_dBu_ma_de_kho_na_nyid. The section in brackets, which is the citation of TA 15b, is added to the only extant manuscript of this work as an interlinear note (*mchan*). Given that this set of interlinear notes includes references to Gyamarwa himself, this might more precisely be counted as a mention of Śrīgupta's position on conceptual gnosis as stated in TA 15b rather than a citation proper. My thanks to Hugon and Vose for bringing this passage to my attention (personal correspondence). For an analysis of the interlinear notes in this manuscript, see Hugon, "Wonders in margin—Mapping the Madhyamaka network of Gyamarwa Jangchupdrak" in the present volume.

k Gyamarwa also mentions Śrīgupta's endorsement of a buddha's possession of conceptual gnosis in his *Commentary on the Bodhicaryāvatāra (Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i ṭika)* in *Collected Works of the Kadampas* (Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2006) vol. 6, fol. 64a.3, *ad* BCA 9.14: *slob dpon dpal rtsad ni rjes thob rtog pa dang bcas pa'i thugs kyang yod par bzhed mod kyi / sgra don bsre ba'i rtog pa ni mi srid do //*. My thanks to Vose for bringing this passage to my attention (personal correspondence).

l Dates follow Hugon, *mTshur ston gzhon nu seng ge, Tshad ma shes rab sgron ma* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2004), vii.

m *Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i ṭika legs bshad bsdsu pa*, Otani University Tibetan Works Series, vol. 2 (Kyoto: Rinsen, 1989), 61b.

n This stanza is cited several times in *Jikten Gönpö's Collected Works*, which was discovered with the aid of BDRC's e-text database. Unfortunately, this set of e-texts does not contain identification markers with text titles or page numbers, and the locations of these citations are yet to be tracked down.

TABLE 1 Citations of Śrīgupta's TA/TAV Prior to Longchenpa (*cont.*)

Author	Text	Citation from <i>Tattvāvatāravṛtti</i>
Tsurtön Zhönnu Senggé (c. 1150–1210)	<i>Lamp of Wisdom on Epistemology and Logic (Tshad ma shes rab sgron ma)</i>	TA 13 ^o
Sakya Paṇḍita Kunga gyaltsen (1182–1251)	<i>Auto-commentary on the Treasury of Epistemology and Logic (Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rang 'grel)</i>	TA 13, though misattributed to Dharmakīrti's PV ^P
Uyukpa Sönam Senggé (c. 1200–after 1267) ^q	<i>Logical Proofs to Ornament the Treasury of Epistemology and Logic (bsTan bcos tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rgyan rigs pa grub pa)</i>	TA 13, TA 15, TA 20 ^r
Chomden Reldri (1227–1305)	<i>Flower to Ornament the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Chos mngon pa kun btus rgyan gyi me tog)</i>	TA 15 ^s
	<i>Flower to Ornament the Philosophical Systems (Grub mtha' rgyan gyi me tog)</i>	TA 20 ^t
Üpa Losel Sangyé Yeshé (c. 1270–c. 1355) ^u	<i>Philosophical Systems According to Losel (Blo gsal grub mtha')</i>	TAV AŚ 11 ^v

o Hugon, *mTshur ston*, 129. My thanks to Hugon for bringing this passage to my attention, together with the citations from Tsang Nakpa and Sakya Paṇḍita as identified in Hugon, *mTshur ston*, 129 n. 214.

p *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rang 'grel in Sa skya bka' 'bum: The Complete Works of the Great Masters of the Sa skya Sect of Tibetan Buddhism* (Sd edge edition), vol. 5, ed. by Bsod nams rgya mtsho (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1969), 112b3.

q Dates follow van der Kuijp, "A Treatise on Buddhist Epistemology and Logic Attributed to Klong chen Rab 'byams pa (1308–1364) and its Place in Indo-Tibetan Intellectual History," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 31 (2003), 387.

r Uyukpa cites both TA 13 and TA 15 in his section treating yogic perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) in his *Logical Proofs* in *Uyukpa's Collected Works* (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang, 2007), vol. 1, 206 and 202, respectively, and also cites TA 20 in his section treating the reason from identity (*svabhāvahetu*) at p. 273.

s Chomden Reldri, *Flower to Ornament the Abhidharmasamuccaya*, in *Collected Works* (Lhasa: Khams sprul bsod nams don grub, 2006), vol. 4, 681.

t Chomden Reldri, *Flower to Ornament the Philosophical Systems*, in *Collected Works*, vol. 5, 402.

u Dates follow Kurtis Schaeffer and van der Kuijp, *An Early Tibetan Survey of Buddhist Literature: The Bstan pa rgyas pa rgyan gyi nyi 'od of Bcom ldan ral gri*, Harvard Oriental Series vol. 64 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 75.

v Üpa Losel, *Philosophical Systems*, in *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, edited by Katsumi Mimaki (Kyoto: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo 1982), 200.

TABLE 1 Citations of Śrīgupta's TA/TAV Prior to Longchenpa (*cont.*)

Author	Text	Citation from <i>Tattvātāravṛtti</i>
Pang Lotsawa Lodrö Tenpa (1276–1342)	<i>Extensive Commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya (mNgon pa kun btus kyi rgya cher 'grel pa)</i>	TA 15 ^w

w Pang Lotsawa, *Extensive Commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Kathmandu: Sa skya rgyal yongs gsung rab slob gnyer khang, 1999), 679.

This survey of known Śrīgupta citations predating Longchenpa affords several noteworthy observations. First, prior to Longchenpa, TA 15 on enlightened conceptual gnosis looks to be the most commonly cited stanza from the TA/TAV. This includes what appears to be the earliest citation, from Dharmamitra (fl. c. 800)³⁹ in his sub-commentary on Haribhadra's *Sphuṭārthā* commentary on the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*,⁴⁰ as well as the latest citation, from Pang Lotsawa Lodrö Tenpa (*dpang lo tsā ba blo gros brtan pa*) in his *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (AS) commentary. It thus looks likely that, aside from his neither-one-nor-many argument, Śrīgupta was best known in twelfth to fourteenth century Tibet for his stance on enlightened conceptual gnosis.

39 As with so many Indic Buddhist figures, Dharmamitra's dates are uncertain. Van der Kuijp surmises that he flourished between the start of the ninth century and the latter half of the eleventh century "Remarks on the 'Person of Authority' in the Dga' Ldan Pa / Dge Lugs Pa School of Tibetan Buddhism (Book Review)." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 119, no. 4 (1999), 648. Despite the fact that Dharmamitra is commonly maintained to be a student of Haribhadra, John Makransky charges Dharmamitra with grossly misunderstanding Haribhadra's intent when it comes to the contentious eighth chapter of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and Haribhadra's renowned and controversial treatment of the *dharmakāya* and *svābhāvikakāya* as distinct *kāya*-s; see *Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1997), 263–8. On Dharmamitra, who is known for following Kamalaśīla in uniting the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine with Madhyamaka, see also Seyfort Ruegg "The Gotra, Ekayāna and Tathāgatagarbha: Theories of the Prajñāpāramitā according to Dharmamitra and Abhayākara Gupta," in *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems: Studies in Honor of Edward Conze* (Berkeley: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1977), 283–312.

40 Dharmamitra cites Śrīgupta's discussion of enlightened conceptual gnosis while commenting on the controversial eighth chapter of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* explaining the qualities of the *dharmakāya*. On Dharmamitra's own account of enlightened gnosis, see Almogí, *Rong-zom-pa's Discourses*, 182, 336–340, 453–454.

Although this list of citations is no doubt incomplete, it is nonetheless noteworthy that we can, in fact, trace the lineage of *each* of these pre-Longchenpa Tibetan authors known to cite Śrīgupta back to the Nālandā master, Bodhibhadra, by way of his student, Atiśa, and the Kadampa (*bka' gdams pa*) lineage that was established in the wake of Atiśa's activities in Tibet. This network is represented below:




FIGURE 1 Map of intellectual network predating Longchenpa that highlights the influence of Śrīgupta's TA/TAV. Lines between names indicate known teacher-student relationships and bolded names indicate figures known to have cited Śrīgupta's TA/TAV.

In the brief discussion of this intellectual network that follows, particular attention will be given to citations of those figures temporally closest to Longchenpa—[11] Uyukpa Sönam Senggé (*'u yug pa bsod nams seng ge*, or *rigs pa'i seng ge*), [12] Chomden Reldri, [13] Ūpa Losel Sanggyé Yeshé (*dbus pa blo gsal sangs rgyas ye shes*), and [12*] Pang Lotsawa Lodrö Tenpa (*dpang lo tsā ba blo gros brtan pa*)—which are jointly representative of Śrīgupta's four most commonly cited stanzas prior to Longchenpa: TA 13, TA 15, TA 20, and TAV AŚ 11.

Following [1] Bodhibhadra and [2] Atiśa in this list is [3*] *Prajñāmukti, likely a member of Atiśa's entourage in Tibet who authored a commentary on Atiśa's *Madhyamakopadeśa*.⁴¹ Hereafter, we may observe a trend of some

41 Given that the translation of the *Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti* is attributed in the colophon to Shes rab thar pa together with Naktso Lotsawa Tsultrim Gyelwa (*nag tsho lo tsā ba*

kind of affiliation (or at least ancestral affiliation) with the great Kadampa monastery of Sangpu Neutok (*gsang phu ne'u thog*),⁴² founded by Atiśa's student, [3] Ngok Lekpé Sherap (*rngog legs pa'i shes rab*). It is with Ngok Lekpé Sherap's nephew, [4] Ngok Lotsawa Loden Sherap (*rngog lo tsā ba blo ldan shes rab*), that Sangpu began to take center stage as the preeminent institution of Kadam scholasticism.⁴³ Subsequent to his travels and training in Kashmir, Ngok Lotsawa gained renown as a translator-cum-commentator, initiating

tshul khrims rgyal ba, 1011–1064), who invited Atiśa to Tibet, James Apple comments that *Prajñāmukti was most likely in Atiśa's entourage accompanying him in his travels to Tibet; see *Jewels of the Middle Way: The Madhyamaka Legacy of Atiśa and His Early Tibetan Followers* (Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2018), 279. Apple renders the Sanskrit for Shes rab thar pa as Prajñāmukti, while others render his name Prajñāmokṣa, including Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka*, 113, Karl Brunnhölzl, *Straight from the Heart: Buddhist Pith Instructions* (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2007), 89, and David Higgins and Martina Draszczyk, *Mahāmudrā and the Middle Way: Post-classical Kagyü Discourses on Mind, Emptiness and Buddha-nature* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 2016), 185 n. 565. The *Madhyamakopadeśavṛtti* is the only work attributed to *Prajñāmukti in the Tengyur. For an English translation of this text, see Apple, *Jewels of the Middle Way*, 279–90; see also Brunnhölzl, *Straight from the Heart*, 506–507, for translations of selections of this text.

- 42 On the history of this institution, located on the eastern bank of the Kyichu (*skyid chu*) near Lhasa, see Hugon, “Enclaves of Learning, Religious and Intellectual Communities in Tibet: The Monastery of gSang Phu Ne'u Thog in the Early Centuries of the Later Diffusion of Buddhism,” in *Meanings of Community across Medieval Eurasia: Comparative Approaches* (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 289–308. On the intellectual networks at Sangpu, see also Hugon's and Vose's contributions in the present volume. Post-Longchenpa citations of the TA also evince a Sangpu connection, including the following: Gö Lotsawa, who was educated at Sangpu, cites TA 5 in his *Ratnagotravibhāga* commentary, in *'Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal's Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga-vyākhyā* edited by Klaus-Dieter Mathes (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2003), 181; Rongtön Sheja Kunrik (*rong ston shes bya kun rig* or *śākya rgyal mtshan*, 1367–1449), also of Sangpu, cites TA 20 in his *Illumination of the Path of Reasoning* (*dBu ma rigs pa'i tshogs kyi dka' ba'i gnad bstan pa rigs lam kun gsal*) in *Collected Works* (Skye dgu mdo: Gangs ljongs rig rgyan gsung rab par khang, 2004), vol. 6, 25b2–3; Rongtön's student, Gorampa Sōnam Senggé (*go rams pa bsod nams seng ge*, 1429–89) cites TA 20 in his *Abhisamayālamkāra* commentary (*Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan 'grel pa dang bcas pa'i dka' ba'i gnas rnam par bshad pa yum don rab gsal*), in *Collected Works* (sDe dge par khang: Sakya College, 1979), vol. 6, 207a6–207b1.
- 43 On the life and work of Ngok Lotsawa, see van der Kuijp, *Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983), 29ff, David Jackson “An Early Biography of rNgog Lo-tśā-ba Blo-ldan-shes-rab,” in *Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Fagernes 1992* (Oslo: Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1994), 372–92, Ralf Kramer, *The Great Tibetan Translator: Life and Works of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109)* (Munich: Indus Verlag, 2007), and Kazuo Kano, *Buddha-nature and Emptiness: rNgog Blo-ldan-shes-rab and a Transmission of the Ratnagotravibhāga from India to Tibet* (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 2016), 191–210.

long-lasting commentarial lineages (*rgnog lugs*) on the Prajñāpāramitā, the five treatises of Maitreya, works on logic and epistemology (*pramāṇa*), as well as the Madhyamaka works of Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla, the so-called “three Mādhyamikas of the East” (Tib. *dbu ma shar gsum*). One of Ngok Lotsawa’s grand-students was [6] Gyamarwa,⁴⁴ who brought attention to Śrīgupta’s view on conceptual gnosis in both his *Bodhicaryāvatāra* commentary as well as in his independent Madhyamaka work, *Analysis of the Essence of Madhyamaka*. Gyamarwa was in turn a principal teacher of the renowned sixth abbot of Sangpu, [7] Chapa Chökyi Senggé (*phyapa chos kyi seng ge*, 1109–1169). Both Chapa and Gyamarwa were teachers to the founder of the Pakdro Kagyü (*phag gru bka’ brgyud*) tradition, [8†] Pakmodrupa Dorjé Gyelpo (*phag mo gru pa rdo rje rgyal po*),⁴⁵ who was in turn the principal teacher of the founder of Drikung Kagyü (*’bri gung bka’ brgyud*), [9†] Jikten Gönpö Rinchen Pel (*’jig rten mgon po rin chen dpal*, or *’jig rten gsum mgon*), who cites TAV SŚ 3 several times in his collected writings.

Another of Chapa’s students, [8] Tsang Nakpa Tsöndrö Senggé (*gtsang nag pa brtson ’grus seng ge*), cites TA 13 in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, and following him, this same stanza is cited in epistemology and logic treatises by Tsang Nakpa’s student, [9] Tsurton Zhonnu Senggé (*mtshur ston gzhon nu seng ge*), Tsurton’s student,⁴⁶ [10] Sakya Paṇḍita Kunga

44 Gyamarwa lived between the end of the 11th and the 12th century (fl. c. 1095–1135) and was active in Tölung (*stod lung*). On Gyamarwa’s life and works, see Per K. Sørensen and Guntram Hazod, in cooperation with Tsering Gyalbo, *Rulers on the Celestial Plain: Ecclesiastic and Secular Hegemony in Medieval Tibet: A Study of Tshal Gung-thang* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007), 420, n. 25, van der Kuijp, “Phya-pa Chos-kyi Seng-ge’s Impact on Tibetan Epistemological Theory,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5 (1978), 355, van der Kuijp, *Contributions*, 60, Seyfort Ruegg, *Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought, Part 1—Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy* (Wien: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien, 2000): 36 and n. 63, and Ritsu Akahane, “Three Tibetan Commentaries on *dBu ma bden gnyis*,” *Report of the Japanese Association for Tibetan Studies* 56 (2010), 78, as well as Hugon’s and Vose’s contributions in the present volume. Gyamarwa was a student of Khyung Rinchendrak (*khyung rin chen grags*) and Gangpa Sheu Lodrö Jangchup (*gangs pa she’u blo gros byang chub*), who were both students of Ngok Loden Sherap.

45 See van der Kuijp, “Phya-pa,” 355. Chapa’s other students included the first Karmapa Düsum Khyenpa (*dus gsum mkhyen pa*, 1110–93) as well as Sönam Tsemo, the second of the five Sakya forefathers (*sa skya gong ma lnga*). For a compilation of information and resources on Chapa’s life and works, see Hugon’s “Compiled Information on the Life and Works of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and Bibliographical Resources” at www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/PhyaPaChosKyiSengGe.

46 Tsurton was also a student of Chapa’s. On the life of Tsurton, see Hugon, *Mtshur ston*, vii–viii.

Gyeltsen (*sa skya paṇḍita kun dga' rgyal mtshan*),⁴⁷ and Sakya Paṇḍita's student, [11] Uyukpa Sönam Senggé. It is in Uyukpa's commentary on Sakya Paṇḍita's *Treasury of Epistemology and Logic* that he cites TA 13, as well as TA 15 and TA 20. TA 13 reads:

Through the power of meditation,
some meditators become familiarized with
the insubstantiality of all things,
just like seeing an ordinary object.⁴⁸

This citation concludes the meditative insight (*vipaśyanā*) chapter of the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* attributed to Atiśa. And Tsurtön, for instance, cites this stanza in the context of explaining that meditating on the nature of reality (*de kho na nyid*) is the cause for the omniscient gnosis that understands the ultimate nature of things (*ji lta ba mkhyen pa'i ye shes skye ba'i rgyu*), and it appears in Sakya Paṇḍita's and Uyukpa's treatment of yogic perception. In this rather uncontroversial stanza, we find little grounds for Longchenpa's ascription of the distinct-appearance-and-emptiness view to Śrīgupta.

Uyukpa was in turn a teacher of the great Nartang (*snar thang*) scholar, prolific author, and canon cataloger [12] Chomden Reldri.⁴⁹ From Uyukpa, Chomden Reldri received numerous transmissions of works on logic and epistemology (*pramāṇa*), including Sakya Paṇḍita's *Treasury of Epistemology and Logic* together with Uyukpa's own commentary on that work, in which he cites the TA.⁵⁰ Chomden Reldri accordingly cites TA 15 in his AS commentary

47 These *pramāṇa* treatises by Tsang Nakpa, Tsurtön, and Sakya Paṇḍita contain a great number of parallels including citations in common, as documented in Hugon, *Mtshur ston*.

48 TA 13, 106–107: 'ga' zhig sgom [N: bsgom] pa [Uyukpa: pas] goms pa yi // mthu yis chos kun ngo bo nyid // med pa yi [N: yid] ni bdag nyid du // 'gyur te dngos po mthong ba bzhin //. Tsurtön's citation of this stanza includes several noteworthy variants: 'ga' 'is chos kun bdag med pa // goms pa de'i bdag nyid du // 'gyur te dngos po mthong pa bzhin // (Hugon, *Mtshur ston*, 129; f. 28a8–9).

49 On Chomden Reldri's life, work, and activities, see van der Kuijp, "A Treatise," 406ff, and Schaeffer and van der Kuijp, *An Early Tibetan Survey*, 3–8. Besides Uyukpa, Chomden Reldri's teachers included Dānaśīla who was a member of the Kaśmīri paṇḍita, Śākyaśrībhadrā's (1127–1225) entourage on his travels in Tibet, Chak Lotsawa Chöjé Pel (Chag Lo tsā ba Chos rje dpal, 1197–1264), Sakya Paṇḍita, and a "Master 'Phags pa" which may refer to 'Phags pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan (1235–80).

50 Other *pramāṇa* treatises Uyukpa is said to have taught Chomden Reldri include Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccya*, together with Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Nyāyabindu*, *Santānāntarasiddhī*, *Sambandhapariḥṣā*, *Hetubindu*. Additional transmissions related to the present inquiry that Chomden Reldri is recorded as having received include Atiśa's *Bodhipathapradīpa* and *pañjikā*, *Satyadvayāvatāra*, *Madhyamakopadeśa*, *Nyelzhik's*

and TA 20 in his doxography, *Flower to Ornament the Philosophical Systems*,⁵¹ the latter cited in his presentation of the Svātantrika neither-one-nor-many argument, where he explains why the reason does not incur the fault of being identical with the property to be proved (Skt. *pratijñāikadeśa*):

The suitability of the conventional treatment (*vyavahārayogyatā*) of the absence of independent being is established.

Due to the absence of a unitary or non-unitary independent being, [all things] in fact lack independent being.

TA 20⁵²

In TA 20, Śrīgupta differentiates the reason and thesis by claiming that it is only the suitability for the conventional treatment of independent being as absent that is established—not the actual absence of independent being. This is in keeping with Dharmakīrti's account of the output of inferences from non-apprehension (*anupalabdhihetu*). Significant for the present inquiry, Chomden Reldri points out that Śāntarakṣita follows a similar strategy to Śrīgupta in his MAV *ad k.* 62, so here too, we find no basis for classifying these two thinkers differently. It is, however, noteworthy that in this same text, Chomden Reldri divides the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, which he identifies respectively with the Māyopamādvayavāda and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda, based on whether or not a buddha is held to possess gnosis.⁵³

pramāṇa tradition, and Gyamarwa's commentarial tradition of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*. Chomden Reldri's teachers included another of Nyelzhik's students in addition to Uyukpa, Kyok Darmadrak (*skyogs dar ma grags*), from whom he received Nyelzhik's *Tshad ma bsdu pa* (*ibid.*, 46), as well as Dānaśīla, a member of the Kaśmiri paṇḍita Śākyaśrībhadrā's (1127–1225) entourage in his travels in Tibet, Chak Lotsawa Chōjé Pel (Chag Lo tsā ba Chos rje dpal, 1197–1264), Sakya Paṇḍita, from whom he received teachings on the *Treasury of Epistemology and Logic*, and a "Master 'Phags pa" which may refer to 'Phags pa Blo gros rgyal mtshan (1235–80). See Samten Zangpo's (*bsam gtan bzang po*, c. 14th century) *Biography of Chomden Reldri* (*Bcom ldan rigs pa'i ral gri'i nam thar dad pa'i ljon shing*) (Lhasa: khams sprul bsod nams don grub, 2006), 46–60.

51 Chomden Reldri's citation of TA 15abc is identical to Uyukpa's reading, while TA 15d accords with the Tengyur editions of the TAV. Uyukpa's citation in *Logical Proofs*, 202 reads: *sems can rnam's kyi don mdzad thabs // rnam rtoḡ ye shes mnga' bas na // de yi kun mkhyen rtsom pa nyid // de don yin phyir gnyis 'di med //* (variants underlined).

52 TA 20, 100: *rang bzhin med pa'i tha snyad du // rung ba nyid du sgrub par byed // gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin nyid // bral bas rang bzhin med pa nyid //*. Chomden Reldri's citation has two variants in TA 20cd, *Flower to Ornament the Philosophical Systems* 402: *gcig dang du ma'i rang bzhin dang // bral ba rang bzhin med pa nyid //*.

53 *Flower to Ornament the Philosophical Systems*, 39iff. Chomden Reldri's division of Madhyamaka into Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika is representative of the shift that took

Chomden Reldri was in turn a teacher of [13] Üpa Losel,⁵⁴ who was also affiliated with Nartang.⁵⁵ Üpa Losel, an elder contemporary of Longchenpa's, is well-known for his major role in the compilation of the Nartang Kangyur and Tengyur.⁵⁶ In his *Philosophical Systems*, Üpa Losel cites TAV AŚ 11, which is the second most cited stanza prior to Longchenpa, also referenced by Dharmamitra and [1] Bodhibhadra, in his explanation of the Madhyamaka object of negation (Skt. *pratiṣedhya*, Tib. *dgag par bya ba*). The stanza reads,

With the correct view,
not even the subtlest essence is cognized.
Therefore, the absence of independent being is propounded,
but not due to denying appearances.

TAV AŚ 11⁵⁷

Here, Śrīgupta clarifies that it is an essence, or the substantial reality of things—and not their mere appearance—that is negated when emptiness is established by a Madhyamaka argument like his neither-one-nor-many argument. Üpa Losel takes Śrīgupta to be in agreement on this point with a range of Mādhyamikas, providing a list of similar citations: Jñānagarbha's SDV 28, Śāntarakṣita's MA 78, Kamalaśīla's TĀ (D 262a5), Śāntideva's BCA 9.26, Nāgārjuna's VV 23.⁵⁸ Once again, we come up short of finding textual evidence to support isolating Śrīgupta doxographically.

A grand-disciple of Chapa, [9*] Nyelzhik Jampel Dorjé (*gnyal zhig jam dpal/dpa'i rdo rje*),⁵⁹ serves as another link in this intellectual network. Nyelzhik was abbot of Lingtö (*gling stod*) from 1199–1207 and had nine principal students, or

place from the earlier doxographical divisions between Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and/or Māyopamādvayavāda and Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda. In this he follows Uyukpa, who also uses the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika categories in his *Logical Proofs*.

54 On the life of Üpa Losel, see Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, 13–15.

55 It bears noting that Nartang was host to a satellite institute of Sangpu.

56 While Chomden Reldri's canonical catalogue does not appear to represent a physical collection, the differentiation between the Kangyur and Tengyur categories as divisions of the canon seems to trace back to his work. Üpa Losel, however, compiled one of the earliest physical Tengyur collections at Nartang; see Schaeffer and van der Kuijp, *An Early Tibetan Survey*, 9–10.

57 TAV AŚ 11, 106: *yang dag lta bas phra rab kyi // ngo bo yang ni mi shes so // de phyir rang bzhin med smra yi // snang ba bsal [P, N, G: gsal] phyir ma yin no //*.

58 Mimaki, *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, 200; for an English translation of this section, see MacDonald, *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, 124–127.

59 Nyelzhik's teacher was Denbakpa Mawai Senggé (*dan bag pa smra ba'i seng ge*), one of Chapa's preeminent disciples and an abbot of Sangpu's Upper College; see Gareth

“sons” (*gnyalzhig gi bu dgu*) who founded a number of satellite institutes (*bshad grwa*), assisting in the diffusion of the teachings associated with Sangpu.⁶⁰ One of Nyelzhik’s nine principal disciples was [11] Uyukpa Sönam Senggé, who later converted to Sakya (*sa skya*) becoming a disciple of Sakya Paṇḍita.⁶¹ In a second branch of this network, the lineage of [12*] Pang Lotsawa can also be traced back to [9] Nyelzhik by way of [10*] Bodong Rinchen Tsemo (*bo dong rin chen rtse mo*, 12th–13th century), who was another of Nyelzhik’s nine principal disciples.⁶² Rinchen Tsemo was the progenitor of the Bodong (*bo dong*) tradition and a principal teacher to Pang Lotsawa’s teacher, [11*] Takdé Senggé Gyeltsen (*stag sde seng ge rgyal mtshan*, 1212–1294). Pang Lotsawa studied and taught at Sangpu and went on to become the abbot of Bodong É (*bo dong e*) Monastery.⁶³ Like his elder contemporary, Chomden Reldri, Pang Lotsawa cites TA 15 in his own AS commentary. Despite the fact that Chomden Reldri is not in Pang Lotsawa’s AS transmission lineage as attested in the colophon of his own commentary, it is not unlikely that Pang Lotsawa was exposed to Chomden Reldri’s teachings on this text and that he managed to come into possession of a manuscript copy of Chomden Reldri’s commentary.⁶⁴ This looks all but

Sparham, “A Note on Gnyalzhig ’Jam pa’i rdo rje, the Author of a Handwritten Sher phyin Commentary from about 1200,” *The Tibet Journal* 21.1 (1996), 19–29.

- 60 See Hugon, “Enclaves,” 301ff. On the activities of Nyelzhik’s “nine sons,” see Fumihito Nishizawa, “gSang phu ne’u thog: Its Contribution to the Re-establishment and Development of Tibetan Buddhism in the Later Diffusion (*phyi dar*) Period,” *Journal of Research Institute: Historical Development of the Tibetan Languages* 51 (2014), 353ff.
- 61 Uyukpa is said to have gone to Sakya Paṇḍita to engage Sakya Paṇḍita in debate and ended up becoming his disciple; see van der Kuijp, “A Treatise on Buddhist Epistemology and Logic Attributed to Klong chen Rab ’byams pa (1308–1364) and its Place in Indo-Tibetan Intellectual History,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 31 (2003), 401.
- 62 On Bodong Rinchen Tsemo, see Gene Smith, *Among Tibetan Texts: History and Literature of the Himalayan Plateau* (Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2001), 180.
- 63 On the life of Pang Lotsawa, see Smith, *Among Tibetan Texts*, 315 n. 604, ’Phrin las chos grags’s *Bod kyi lo tsā’i rigs lam rnam bshad blo gsal ’jug ngogs* (Beijing: *Krung go’i bod rig pa dpe skrun khang*, 2010), 335–338, and Kano, *Buddha-nature*, 172–73.
- 64 Neither of the texts provides a date of composition, and while these two authors were contemporaries, with Chomden Reldri’s dates 1227–1305 and Pang Lotsawa’s 1276–1342, the direction of influence is most plausibly from Chomden Reldri to Pang Lotsawa. For, according to Samten Zangpo’s *Biography*, 79–80, Chomden Reldri’s AS commentary was completed prior to 1262 together with a great many treatises, and for the next five years until he reached the age of forty-four, Chomden Reldri continuously taught texts including the AS, *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, and (a) *Tshad ma bsdu pa*. Moreover, many handwritten manuscripts of his writings are known to have circulated; as Schaeffer and van der Kuijp note, “the library of ’Bras spungs monastery’s Gnas bcu lha khang contained some seventy-five texts that issued from his fertile pen, a good number of which in multiple copies” (*An Early Tibetan Survey*, 51). Moreover, in Pang Lotsawa’s colophon, he acknowledges that his commentary includes material from many other treatises.

certain given the conspicuous parallels between these two AS commentaries. Both texts cite TA 15 with precisely the same variants from the received Tengyur editions of the TAV, and these texts are strikingly similar in the section where this citation occurs, adducing a string of identical citations and even overlapping substantially in the wording of the commentary linking these citations.⁶⁵

Most significantly for the present inquiry is, of course, the fact that Pang Lotsawa was one of Longchenpa's principal teachers during his seven years at Sangpu beginning in 1326 at the age of 19.⁶⁶ Longchenpa's place in this network is represented below:




FIGURE 2 Map of intellectual network leading up to Longchenpa that highlights the influence of Śrīgupta's TA/TAV. Solid lines between names indicate known teacher-student relationships, dotted line indicates evidence of textual influence, and bolded names indicate figures known to have cited Śrīgupta's TA/TAV.

65 For instance, leading up to the citations of TA 15, both Chomden Reldri and Pang Lotsawa's commentaries cite *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* 68, 70-74, and *Ratnagotravibhāga* 1.93, interspersed with word for word identical commentary in many instances, and follow TA 15 with a citation of Śubhagupta's *Bāhyārthasiddhi* 9. See Chomden Reldri, *Flower to Ornament of the Abhidharmasamuccaya*, 679-81, and Pang Lotsawa, *Extensive Commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya*, 678-80. Pang Lotsawa's citation of TA 15 is identical to Chomden Reldri's, with the same variant readings from the Tengyur editions of the TAV (see note 68 above), and is commenting on the same section in the root text, which examines the three *kāyas* as one of the salient differences (*trikāyaviśeṣa*) between the realization of *śrāvakas* and bodhisattvas in terms of the result, under the category of examining the characteristics of the result within section two, the definition of realization (*abhisamayavyavasthāna*), in the second chapter of the AS, "Vinīcayasamuccaya."

66 For an account of Longchenpa's teachers and a record of teachings received, see Chödrak Zangpo's (*chos grags bzang po*) *Biography of Drimé Özer (Dri med 'od zer gyi mam thar mthong ba don ldan)* in *Collected Works* (dPal brtsegs mes po'i shul bzhang), vol. 4, 184ff.

Pang Lotsawa is said to have taught [13*] Longchenpa a great many texts, including the seven treatises on logic and epistemology (*pramāṇa*) of Dharmakīrti.⁶⁷ Pang Lotsawa was also a teacher of another of Longchenpa's teachers, Lama Dampa Sönam Gyeltsen.⁶⁸ It is, thus, not unreasonable to suppose that Pang Lotsawa may have exposed Longchenpa to Śrīgupta's view on conceptual gnosis either directly or by way of Sönam Gyeltsen. To discern whether or not this may have informed Longchenpa's doxographical classification of Śrīgupta, let us return to Longchenpa's work.

4 Longchenpa on Doxography and Gnoseology

As it turns out, Longchenpa presents another doxographical schema in his *Dispelling the Darkness of the Mind* (*Yid kyi mun sel*),⁶⁹ wherein he differentiates philosophical systems based on their characterization of enlightenment.⁷⁰ Here again, the Lower Svātantrika has two subdivisions, but in this context, Longchenpa characterizes them as endorsing either the Sākāra or Nirākāra view when it comes to the resultant state of enlightenment. He does not spell out the correspondences between this pair of Lower Svātantrika sub-schools and those presented in the *Commentary*, nor does he name names. But his presentation of the Sākāra account, according to which enlightened gnosis has mental images/representations (*ākāra*), corresponds closely with Śrīgupta's,⁷¹

67 On the teachings Longchenpa received from Pang Lotsawa, see Chödrak Zangpo, *Biography of Drimé Özer*, 184–85.

68 On the teachings Longchenpa received from Sönam Gyeltsen, see Chödrak Zangpo, *Biography of Drimé Özer*, 187–88.

69 See Almogi, *Rong-zom-pa's Discourses*, 475–81, for a translation and discussion of Longchenpa's presentation in comparison with Rongzompa's *Jewel Commentary* (*dKon cog 'grel*, in *Rong zom gsung 'bum*, (Śrī seng, Khams: Padma Kun grol), vol. 1, 6–214), which, like *Dispelling*, comments on the *Guhyagarbha Tantra*, and for an edition of the corresponding Tibetan from *Dispelling*, see Almogi, *Rong-zom-pa's Discourses*, 482–3.

70 Here, rather than dividing Madhyamaka into Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika, Longchenpa divides the Prajñāpāramitā tradition into (1) the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, which corresponds to his Svātantrika, and (2) Mādhyamikas who proceed based on what is commonly accepted (*grags sde spyod pa'i dbu ma*), which corresponds to his Prāsaṅgika. The Yogācāra-Madhyamaka is subdivided into the Higher and Lower Svātantrikas. Longchenpa's account of Śrīgupta here as belonging to a subset of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka places him in agreement with Butön. Curiously, non-Madhyamaka Yogācāra appear to be entirely absent from this doxographical schema, though perhaps its branches of Nirākāravāda and Sākāravāda are combined with the Lower Svātantrika.

71 For an edition of the Tibetan of the relevant passage, see Almogi, *Rong-zom-pa's Discourses*, 482, and for a corresponding English translation, see 478–9.

while that of the Nirākāra view, according to which all representations cease upon enlightenment, is incompatible with Śrīgupta's account of enlightened conceptual gnosis.

Yet, this correspondence is problematized by the fact that Longchenpa associates the Sākāra view with the position that the external objects that appear to ordinary beings are merely mental in nature,⁷² a view that Śrīgupta does not endorse. To make matters worse, Longchenpa presents the Sākāra view first among the two Lower Svātantrika schools, while he presents Śrīgupta's view second in his *Commentary*. Given that the sequence of views in Tibetan doxographies standardly signifies an ascending hierarchy, Longchenpa must have intended to align the Sākāra view with *Sāgaramegha's Lower Svātantrika sub-school and the Nirākāra view with Śrīgupta's Lower Svātantrikas. This is further confirmed by analysis of Longchenpa's presentation of *Sāgaramegha's sub-school in the *Commentary*, where he describes an account of enlightenment that sounds much like the Sākāra view he presents in *Dispelling the Darkness of the Mind*.⁷³

Confoundingly, we may now add yet another claim to our list of positions that Longchenpa attributes to Śrīgupta, but that finds no textual basis: *enlightened gnosis lacks representations* (Claim 6). Below is a summary of the claims that Longchenpa attributes to Śrīgupta, with only the first finding any corroborating textual support in Śrīgupta's TA/TAV:

Claims Longchenpa attributes to Śrīgupta	Corroborating textual evidence
Claim 1: Ultimately, appearances are empty because they are not established.	✓ TA 11 (but also MA 64, MAP <i>ad k</i> .)
Claim 1*: A defining characteristic of the conventional is that it cannot withstand analysis.	64, SDV 13, 21, SDA 3, etc.)

72 For an edition of the Tibetan of the relevant passage, see Almogi, *Rong-zom-pa's Discourses*, 483, and for a corresponding English translation, see 478.

73 In his *Commentary*, Longchenpa states that *Sāgaramegha's sub-school differentiates between non-purified and purified illusion, with the latter persisting in the form of empty appearances even after having attained enlightenment, vol. 2, 100b1–4: *thams cad sgyu ma'i tshul gnyis su 'dod do // de'ang ma dag pa sgyu ma ni / kun rdzob tu snang la don dam par bden pa'i rang bzhin med de lam mthar phyin pa na 'gags pa'i phyir te / bden zhen sgrub pa kun spong ba'i phyir ro // dag pa sgyu ma ni lam du snang la rang bzhin med par bsgoms pas / 'bras bu chos sku dang gzugs sku dbyer med pa'i rang gi ngo bo snang la rang bzhin med pa 'og min na sgyu ma'i tshul du bzhugs pa las / sprul pa sgyu ma lta bu 'byung ba'o //*

(cont.)

Claims Longchenpa attributes to Śrīgupta	Corroborating textual evidence
Claim 2: Conventionally, appearances are not empty because they are causally efficacious.	×
Claim 3: The conventional is divided into real and unreal.	×
Claim 4: A defining characteristic of the ultimate is that it can withstand analysis.	×
Claim 5: Appearance and emptiness are distinct.	×
Claim 6: Enlightened gnosis lacks representations (<i>nirākāra</i>).	×

5 Conclusion: Shifting the Question

Though we did not find the “smoking gun” linking “Śrīgupta’s sub-school” with Śrīgupta himself, this absence of textual grounding may nonetheless offer insight into Longchenpa’s own view on the two truths and his motivation in constructing this doxographical schema. Doxographical ascriptions that “don’t quite fit”—or that do not withstand analysis—can often flag some point that the doxographer deems philosophically important enough to stretch the intellectual-historical facts. After all, doxographies are (arguably) principally rhetorical/pedagogical tools used to clarify the author’s own view by distinguishing it from other positions, utilizing a kind of “*neti neti*,” “not this, not that...” framework to facilitate the reader’s arrival at a more precise understanding of the author’s account of the correct view. By devising new doxographical subdivisions, the author is able to make finer grained distinctions. Śrīgupta’s incompatibility with his doxographical box suggests that he may merely be a nominal figurehead, a placeholder standing in for someone closer to home. Longchenpa can, in this way, dismiss a rival view without explicitly naming names of his Tibetan contemporaries or predecessors. “Canonizing” competing positions in a doxography as belonging to a lower Indian philosophical system is rhetorically powerful and not uncommon in the history of Tibetan doxographies. The slight would be all the more cutting given that the view is represented by a little-known figure and relegated in the hierarchy beneath all of the figures standardly listed as Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka authorities.

We can see how this hypothesis bears some preliminary fruit based on Longchenpa's presentation of the Lower Svātantrika in his *Treasury of Philosophical Systems* (*Grub mtha' mdzod*),⁷⁴ where he sets out four possible views on the relation between the two truths/realities:⁷⁵

- 1 The two realities are identical, and even their conceptual exclusions are non-distinct, i.e., the two realities are both numerically and conceptually identical.
- 2 The two realities are distinct entities, i.e., the two realities are both numerically and conceptually distinct.
- 3 The two realities are the same entity but have distinct conceptual exclusions, i.e., the two realities are numerically identical, but conceptually distinct.
- 4 The two realities are distinct merely by virtue of their unity being rejected, i.e., insofar as the two realities are neither numerically identical nor conceptually identical, they are distinct.

After dismissing the first two of these four views, (1) unqualified identity and (2) unqualified distinction, Longchenpa explains that the third view—(3) that the two realities are the same entity but have distinct conceptual exclusions (*ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa*)—belongs to those lower Svātantrikas who accept the illusory nature of things as the ultimate truth (*sgyu ma don dam pa'i bden par khas len pa*), i.e., *Sāgaramegha's sub-school in the *Commentary*.⁷⁶ Longchenpa's description of the fourth view—that the two realities are distinct merely by virtue of their unity being rejected—aligns with his account of Śrīgupta's sub-school in the *Commentary*, according to which conventional appearances and ultimate emptiness are not numerically identical because

74 In this section, Longchenpa characterizes the Lower Svātantrikas as those who maintain that the ultimate is an object of a rational cognition (*rig[s] shes kyi yul*), while the Higher Svātantrikas do not, yet another claim that Śrīgupta does not endorse.

75 Longchenpa, *Treasury of Philosophical Systems*, 87a3–4: *gnyis pa ni spyir mtshan nyid kyi ldog pa tsam yang tha dad med pa ming gi rnam grangs dang / ngo bo tha dad pa dang / ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad pa dang / gcig pa bkag pa tsam gyi tha dad dang bzhi las / ...* For an English translation of this section, see Richard Barron, trans., *The Precious Treasury of Philosophical Systems: A Treatise Elucidating the Meaning of the Entire Range of Spiritual Approaches* (Junction City, CA: Padma Publishing, 2007), 100.

76 Longchenpa, *Treasury of Philosophical Systems*, 87b4–5: *ngo bog cig la ldog pa tha dad par 'dod pa ni sgyu ma don dam pa'i bden par khas len pa yin te /*. In his *Commentary*, Longchenpa sums up his rejection of the two lower Svātantrika sub-schools, using the same language to describe the position of *Sāgaramegha's sub-school as we find here: since they accept that the illusory nature of things is the ultimate truth, they accept that the two truths are a single entity; *Commentary*, vol. 2, 104a3–4: *des na rang rgyud 'og ma sgyu ma don dam du 'dod pas bden gnyis ngo bo gcig pa dang / snang stong tha dad du 'dod pas ngo bo tha dad du bzhang pa'ang thub pa'i dgongs pa legs par rtogs pa ma yin no //*.

they instantiate contradictory properties. Longchenpa's presentation of these two Lower Svātantrika sub-schools is summarized in the table below:

Sub-school of Lower Svātantrika according to the <i>Commentary on the Wish-Fulfilling Treasury</i>	Figurehead according to the <i>Commentary on the Wish-Fulfilling Treasury</i>	Status of enlightened gnosis according to <i>Dispelling the Darkness of the Mind</i>	Relation between the two realities according to the <i>Treasury of Philosophical Systems</i>
Lower Svātantrikas who accept the illusory nature of things as the ultimate truth (Māyopamādvayavāda)	*Sāgaramegha	Sākāra	The two realities are the same entity but have distinct conceptual exclusions.
Lower Svātantrikas who accept that appearance and emptiness are distinct	Śrīgupta	Nirākāra	The two realities are distinct merely by virtue of their unity being rejected.

In rejecting each of these four possible relations between the two realities presented in his *Treasury of Philosophical Systems*, Longchenpa runs the dyadic version of the neither-one-nor-many argument—the neither-distinct-nor-identical (Skt. *bedhābedha*) argument—against the Svātantrikas, taking the two realities as the subject. This analysis has a long tradition in India and Tibet, going back at least to the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*. Indeed, in concluding his section on the Lower Svātantrikas in his *Commentary*, Longchenpa makes this strategy explicit:

According to the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*, “The [conventional] conditioned elements and the ultimate are characterized by being neither identical nor distinct. To understand [the two realities] as either identical or distinct is to adopt an improper view.”⁷⁷ Thus, the Lower Svātantrikas [like *Sāgaramegha], who posit the two realities as a single entity

77 SNS 3.3–5.

because they accept the illusory [nature] as the ultimate, and the [Lower Svātantrikas like Śrīgupta], who posit [the two realities] as distinct entities because they accept appearance and emptiness as distinct, do not properly understand the intent of the Sage. Why is that? Because they fall into the extremes of existence and non-existence.⁷⁸

The *Samdhanirmocana Sūtra* rejects only Longchenpa's view 1 and view 2 above—the unqualified identity and distinction of the two realities. In fact, views 3 and 4 do not appear to have been defended in India at all, but instead seem to have developed within the early Tibetan scholastic context as more nuanced accounts of the relation between the two truths. These Tibetan views that insist on providing some positive characterization of the relation between the two truths as either identical or distinct *in some respect* are, then, the actual target of Longchenpa's critique-in-the-guise-of-doxography, and he charges them with falling into one or other of the two extremes views of realism or nihilism. According to Longchenpa, even the so-called “Higher Svātantrikas” understand that the two truths are neither identical or distinct.⁷⁹ Yet, Longchenpa argues, the Higher Svātantrika too stray into the extremes of realism and nihilism because they affirm the reality of things conventionally, while denying their reality ultimately.⁸⁰ It is, then, only the Prāsaṅgika, the “pinnacle of Mahāyāna Buddhist views,”⁸¹ that correctly negates the entirety of conceptual fabrications superimposed on the two truths and their relation. All of these so-called Svātantrika views err because they engage in some sort of ontological theorizing on the basis of the two truths, but, as Nāgārjuna states,

78 Longchenpa, *Commentary*, vol. 2, 104a.1–b1: *dgongs pa nges par 'grel ba'i mdo las / 'du byed kham dang don dam mtshan nyid ni // gcig dang tha dad bral ba'i mtshan nyid de // gcig dang tha dad nyid du gang rtog pa // de dag tshul min lta la zhugs pa yin // zhes so // des na rang rgyud 'og ma sgyu ma don dam du 'dod pas bden gnyis ngo bo gcig pa dang / snang stong tha dad du 'dod pas ngo bo tha dad du bzhag pa'ang thub pa'i dgongs pa legs par rtogs pa ma yin no // ci'i phyir zhe na / yod med kyi mthar lhung ba'i phyir /*

79 Longchenpa, *Commentary*, vol. 2, 104b.1–2: *rang rgyud gong ma ni / slob dpon ye shes snying po dang / zhi ba 'tsho dang / ka ma la shi la la sogs pa rnam kyis thub pa'i dgongs pa 'di ltar rtogs te / yang dag par mtha' las 'das shing / ...* See also 105b–106a.

80 Longchenpa, *Commentary* 110b.2–3: *des na tshul 'di yang sgro btags kyi gzeb las ma 'das pas snang bar grub / don la ma grub ces pas rtag chad las ma 'das pa nyid de snang stong la bden zhen gyi cha ma bral ba'i phyir ro /*. See also *Treasury of Philosophical Systems*, 98a.3–4. Longchenpa further criticizes the Svātantrika's division of the conventional into real and unreal, arguing that there is no meaningful ontological distinction between, for example, the reflection of the moon in water (which is ordinarily considered an illusion) and the moon in the sky; see *Commentary*, 106b–107a.

81 Longchenpa, *Commentary*, vol. 2, 111a.3: *nang pa sangs rgyas pa dag gi mtshan nyid theg pa chen po'i rtse mo dbu ma thal ba'i lugs ...*

the Mādhyamika has no thesis.⁸² According to Longchenpa, the conventional is simply the confused domain of the ordinary, conceptual intellect while the ultimate is free from the extremes of conceptual fabrications, being the domain of reflexively aware gnosis.⁸³

But who precisely is Longchenpa targeting in rejecting views 3 and 4, if no Indian scholars fit the bill? Who is he demoting to the status of “Lower Svāntarikas,” the lowest of Madhyamaka views in his doxographical hierarchy? Preceding Longchenpa, we find this same analysis of four views on the relation between the two truths taken up by Gyamarwa and Chapa in different but both influential ways.⁸⁴ Longchenpa’s characterization and critiques of these views bear many significant parallels to these earlier sources. First, Gyamarwa presents this same scheme of four views in his *Analysis* and, as Longchenpa will, Gyamarwa also dismisses the first two and aligns the third with the Māyopamādvayavādins.⁸⁵ Yet Gyamarwa assigns the fourth view, that the two realities are distinct simply by virtue of their unity being rejected (*gcig pa bkag pa tsam gyi dbye ba*), to the Apratiṣṭhānavādins, the view that he himself endorses.⁸⁶ In this he is followed (in one way or another) by many

82 Longchenpa, *Commentary* 112a; here, he cites Nāgārjuna’s vv 29, where he makes the famous and interpretively vexed claim that he has no thesis.

83 Longchenpa, *Commentary* 115a.2–3: *de’ang kun rdzob kyi ngo bo blo dang dbang pos bsam pa’i yul dang / don dam gyi ngo bo so so rang gi rig pa’i ye shes kyi yul spros pa’i mtha’ dang bral ba ste / ...* A thorough treatment of Longchenpa’s presentation of the Prāsaṅgika account of the two truths is beyond the scope of this paper, but see, for example, *Commentary* 115a–122b for his presentation of the two truths from the perspective of the basis, path, and result, and see the *Treasury of Philosophical Systems* 100a–105b for his presentation on understanding the nature of the two truths and how to take that understanding into one’s practice.

84 For discussions of Gyamarwa’s treatment of this fourfold analysis, see Akahane, “The Influence of rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags on Early Tibetan Buddhism in the Period of the Second Diffusion,” *Report of the Japanese Association for Tibetan Studies* 59 (2013), 93–8, and Vose, “Madhyamaka Schools,” 67ff. For a discussion of Chapa’s treatment of this fourfold analysis, see Helmut Tauscher, “Remarks on Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and his Madhyamaka Treatises,” *The Tibet Journal* 34, no. 3/4 and 35, no. 1/2 (2009), 27–8, and Akahane, “The Influence,” 91–3, and see Hugon’s discussion of Gyamarwa’s and Chapa’s treatment of the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* and a response to Tauscher’s remarks in “Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and His Successors on the Classification of Arguments by Consequence (*thal’gyur*) Based on the Type of the Logical Reason,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 44, no. 5 (2016), 909ff.

85 He attributes this view on the relation between the two realities to a “Geshepa” (*dge bshes pa*), who, Hugon argues in her contribution to the present volume, refers to his own Madhyamaka teacher, Khyung Rinchen drak (see *Analysis*, 2b.2–2b.7).

86 Gyamarwa, *Analysis*, 2b.1–2b.2: *ngo bo gcig la chos kyi dbye ba’am / gcig pa bkag pa tsam gyi dbye ba las ... sgyu ma dang rab tu mi gnas pa’i bye brag las dpyad par bya’o //*.

prominent scholars, including most notably Longchenpa's controversial contemporary, Dölpopa Sherap Gyeltsen (*dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan*, 1292–1361),⁸⁷ as well as subsequent Sakyapas like Gorampa,⁸⁸ placing them in agreement with “Śrīgupta's Lower Svātantrikas.” And the “same entity, but distinct conceptual exclusions” view was famously endorsed by Chapa,⁸⁹ and was soon to be embraced by Tsongkhapa Lobsang Drakpa (*tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa*, 1357–1419) and the emerging Gelukpas (*dge lugs pa*),⁹⁰ placing them in agreement with “*Sāgaramegha's Lower Svātantrikas.” In fact, where

87 Dölpopa states in his *Doctrine for Mountain Hermits* (*Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho*) (Gangtok: Dodrup Sangyey Lama, 1976), 384: *thams cad kyis stong pa mi srid de chos nyid kyis stong pa mi srid pa'i phyir ro/ chos thams cad kyis stong pa'i gzhi ni srid de chos nyid do/ chos nyid kyis stong pa'i gzhi ni mi srid de ha cang thal ba dpag tu med pas gnod pa'i phyir ro/ des na thams cad kyis stong pa dang chos thams cad kyis stong pa ni khyad par shin tu che ste/ gnas lugs la chos kyis stong yang chos nyid kyis mi stong pa'i phyir ro / 'dis ni chos dang chos nyid ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad du 'dod pa dang/ tha dad gtan med du 'dod pa yang bsal ba yin te/ de gnyis ni ngo bo gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad yin pa'i phyir /*. See also Dölpopa's *Sun Illuminating the Two Truths* (*bDen gnyis gsal ba'i nyi ma*), in *Collected Works* ('Dzam thang par ma), vol. 6, 711: *bden gnyis ngo bo de nyid dang/ gzhan du brjod du med pa gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad pa yin*.

88 Gorampa endorses this position only on the conventional level.

89 See, for instance, Chapa's *Heart Essence of Madhyamaka*, *dBu ma shar gsum gyi stong thun*, edited by Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1999), 2.7–9.17 and 10.6–12. Although Chapa's “same entity, distinct exclusion” view of the two realities places him in agreement with both Gyamarwa's and Longchenpa's Māyopamādvayavādins (“*Sāgaramegha's Lower Svātantrikas”), Chapa also claims that the ultimate withstands analysis (Claim 4 in the chart above), a point of agreement with “Śrīgupta's Lower Svātantrikas.” Chapa further claims that the ultimate is cognized by a rational cognition, a position that Longchenpa attributes to both sub-schools of the Lower Svātantrika. See Chapa, *Heart Essence*, 93.14–97.14, Vose “Madhyamaka Schools,” 72–3, Vose, “Making and Remaking the Ultimate,” 294–95, and Vose, *Resurrecting Candrakīrti: Disputes in the Tibetan Creation of Prāsaṅgika* (Somerville: Wisdom Publications, 2009), 92–9. As Vose (“Madhyamaka Schools,” 72) points out, however, Chapa, like Rongzompa, Ngok Lotsāwa, Drolungpa, Gyamarwa, etc., criticizes the Māyopamādvayavādins, whom he characterizes as maintaining that the ultimate is the union of appearance and emptiness (*snang stong gnyis tshogs*). Yet elsewhere, Chapa claims that all Mādhyamikas are in agreement when it comes to the ultimate, and the Māyopamādvayavāda-Sarvadharmāpratiṣṭhānavāda distinction is inapt. For an edition and English translation of the relevant passage from Chapa's *Differentiating Text Traditions* (*bDe bar gshegs pa dang phyi rol pa'i gzhung mam par 'byed pa*, 65.6–67.2), see Almogi, “Māyopamādvayavāda,” 195–7, 165–8.

90 For a discussion of the influence of Chapa on the Gelukpa in this regard, see Seitetsu Moriyama, “The relationship between the two truths, *bDen pa gnyis*, According to Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, and the Influence of His Interpretation on the dGe lugs pa Tradition,” in *Studies in the Philosophy and History of Tibet* (Halle: International Institute for Tibetan and Buddhist Studies GmbH, 2010), 131–143.

we came up short in finding textual support from Śrīgupta for the claims Longchenpa ascribes to him, we find explicit agreement on an overwhelming number of these points in the works of Gyamarwa and Chapa, and the many scholars whom they influenced. Although a survey of these parallels is beyond the scope of the present paper, from this preliminary inquiry, it is safe to conclude that the relatively obscure Indic figureheads of Longchenpa's Lower Svāntantrika sub-schools are obscuring competing figures or schools of thought in Longchenpa's Tibetan intellectual milieu following in the tradition of his own Sangpu forefathers, Gyamarwa and Chapa.

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Abbreviations

- AAA *Abhisamayāḷṅkāṛāloka* (Haribhadra). *Abhisamayāḷṅkāṛāloka Prajñāpāramitāvyaḅhyā* (Commentary on *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā*) by Haribhadra Together with the Text Commented On, edited by Unrai Wogihara. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1932–1935.
- AS *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (Asaṅga). *Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asaṅga*, edited by Pralhad Pradhan. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950.
- AŚ transitional stanza (*antaraśloka*).
- B Tengyur Pedurma (bsTan 'gyur dPe bsdur ma). Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang, 1994–2008.
- BCA *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (Śāntideva). *Prajñākaramati's Commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva*, edited by Louis de la Vallée Poussin. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1905–1914.
- BCAP *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (Prajñākaramati), see BCA.
- C Tengyur Coné (bsTan 'gyur Co ne).
- D Tengyur Dergé (bsTan 'gyur sDe dge). *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka—bsTan 'gyur Preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo*, edited by Z. Yamaguchi, et al. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1977–1988.
- G Tengyur Serdrima (bsTan 'gyur gSer bris ma).
- MA *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* (Śāntarakṣita), see Ichigō, “Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṅkāra*.”
- MAP *Madhyamakālaṅkārapañjikā* (Kamalaśīla). *Madhyamakālaṅkāra of Śāntarakṣita with His Own Commentary or Vṛtti and with the Subcommentary or Pañjikā of Kamalaśīla*, edited by Masamichi Ichigō. Kyoto: Buneido, 1985.
- MAS *Madhyamakārthasaṅgraha* (the later Bhāviveka) D 3857, *dbu ma, dza* 329b4–330a3.

- MAV *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (Śāntarakṣita), see MAP.
- MĀ *Madhyamakāloka* (Kamalaśīla) D 3887, *dbu ma, sa* 133b4–244a7.
- MRP *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (the later Bhāviveka) D 3854, *dbu ma, tsha* 259b3–289a7.
- N Tengyur Nartang (bsTan 'gyur sNar thang).
- P Tengyur Peking (bsTan 'gyur Pe cin). *The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition—Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto—Reprinted Under the Supervision of the Otani University, Kyoto*, 168 vols, edited by D. T. Suzuki. Tokyo/Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1955–61.
- SDA *Satyadvayāvatāra* (Atiśa), see Lindtner, “Atiśa’s Introduction to the Two Truths, and its Sources.”
- SDV *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* (Jñānagarbha), see Eckel, *Jñānagarbha’s Commentary*.
- SNS *Samdhinirmocanasūtra. Samdhinirmocana Sūtra: L’Explication des Mysteres*, edited and translated by Etienne Lamotte. Louvain, Paris: Bureaux du Recueil, 1935.
- SS summary stanza (*saṃgrahaśloka*).
- TA *Tattvāvatāra* (Śrīgupta) see TAV.
- TAV *Tattvāvatāravṛtti* (Śrīgupta) B 3121, vol. 63, 101–112; C 3892 *dbu ma, ha* 39b1–43a5; D 3892 *dbu ma, ha* 39b4–43b5; G 3295 *dbu ma, ha* 56a–62a; N 4064, *dbu ma, ha* 41a5–45b2; P 5292 *dbu ma, ha* 44b2–49a5.
- VV *Vigrahavyāvartinī* (Nāgārjuna). *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartinī*, edited by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, E.H. Johnston, and Arnold Kunst. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998.

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